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About AlkalineHume

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  1. The profit MMs make is their spread times the volume. As volume increases, they can reduce the spread they are willing to buy/sell at and maintain the same profits. By using the method of the patent to increase the volume through xRapid, you are effectively reducing the spread, as MMs will compete with each other for the business. If the spread is small enough that the fiat-XRP-fiat pathway is cheaper than the fiat-fiat pathway, the MMs will stay regardless of whether Ripple provides and incentive. As I said in my post above, a major part of the method's effectiveness is if you can turn off the other siphon. If Ripple's incentive succeeds in pulling MMs away from the fiat-fiat channel you'd know that because the fiat-fiat spread would get a lot worse and the volume would plummet. The same fiat-fiat market they left to chase the incentive wouldn't exist anymore, at least not in nearly the same form, after the incentive succeeded. It's vaguely like a company lowering their prices to put the competition out of business. Once they succeed, they can raise their prices again.
  2. This made it click for me. It's so devious! I think a good analogy is to a siphon: there is a pathway for these trades to happen, but if it's in an "inactive" state, nothing is flowing. Nobody has an incentive to start the flow, because they'd have to pump their water up over the bend.. why not just use a siphon that's already running? Your algorithm decides when to suck on the hose to start the siphon. If your path is massively inefficient, you're going to have to suck pretty darn hard to get the flow going. You might pass out before it gets started But if it's just a little less efficient than the current path, it only takes a little effort to get it going and then it sustains itself. But it seems like the real key is not so much in getting your siphon going, but in breaking the other guy's siphon so that you're the only game in town. Of course, if your pathway can't actually handle the trading volume (i.e. if you were propping up gold as a bridge currency?) you'd never succeed in breaking the other siphon, and it would all collapse soon after you stopped incentivizing the MMs. But if you can handle the volume, it seems like the outcome is assured. It seems Ripple would stand a great chance of succeeding against fiat/fiat pathways because those pathways have no natural advocate: who is going to spend USD to try to pull MMs back to the dollar? Maybe the US government, but that seems pretty unlikely. However, I think you could have some interesting game-theoretic scenarios where Ripple and "Zipple" compete for bridge currency dominance, each trying to wrest flows as cheaply as possible from the other.
  3. Neither But I am an inventor on a handful of patents and have been deeply involved in crafting claimsets with patent attorneys. So I'm translating from my second language rather than my native tongue here. I may miss some idioms, but the gist will be right Thanks for the signpost! That was definitely the most tentative of my replacements. I'll have to go back and sort it out when I get time, unless someone else gets to it first.
  4. Translating Bob's patent (Bob, I hope this is okay.) For those who aren't familiar with patent structure, all patents have a series of "claims" that describe the scope of what the patent is supposed to protect. If someone tries to sell a product that is described by one of those claims, they are infringing on the patent. Claims are either "independent," which means they stand alone, or "dependent," which means they reference some earlier claim (i.e. "A bicycle pedal that cooks pasta" would be independent, "A bicycle pedal of claim 1 that stops cooking when the pasta is al dente" would be dependent). In my own reading, the crucial claims in Bob's patent are Claim 6 and its dependents, which I quote here: As Bob said, there are a fair number of terms here that can be substituted for more familiar ones. Here are the substitutions I suggest to get us started. Note, I'll be doing this for claims 6-13, but the same could be done for the whole patent. I just think this is enough to get us a basic understanding. a plurality of = some the plurality of = the selected resource paths = fiat pairs a resource transfer network = the forex market intermediate resource type = XRP (in some cases "XRP-equivalent") repository resource pool / reservoir resource quantity = XRP liquidity pool front/back resource type = currency A/B resource pool (without "repository" preceding) = XRP-fiat pair Here is the language after making those substitutions (and minor part of speech updates): The key pieces of the invention seem to be 1) determining the size of the XRP liquidity pool and 2) determining how much of the pool to allocate to a given currency pairing.
  5. Ack, I read the rules, but failed to read the request after them It's great to meet you! Your posts have already given me a new perspective on XRP and Ripple. I look forward to learning more!
  6. I think a general discussion of your "Resource Path Monitoring" patent would be of great interest to everyone here. Here is a link to my post/question on it from the original thread: https://www.xrpchat.com/topic/30588-hi-im-bob/page/44/?tab=comments#comment-679705
  7. Hi Bob, I'd like to add to the chorus of thank yous here. I've been intrigued enough by your bread crumbs regarding how Ripple can add XRP into the market without dropping the price to go and read the claims in your "Resource Path Monitoring" patent (that's the one, folks). It looks like claim 6 and its dependents are the key. In my own self-education about Ripple and XRP this question of how can Ripple deploy its massive resources to increase liquidity seemed to be the most urgent question a hodler could hope to have answered. What I've gathered is: 1. It makes sense that someone who has thought about stablecoins a lot might have come up with a solution to this problem. 2. A reasonable starting point is to ask "why couldn't Ripple just be the ur-market maker?" and consider the failure modes of that arrangement (which is analogous to saying "why couldn't Ripple make XRP a stablecoin with arbitrary value?"). 3. I've drafted claimsets for chemistry patents and reading those is hard enough for me, but I think I'm correct in saying that claim 6 and its dependents suggest that the key is finding a corridor for which one trading pair with XRP has a wide bid-ask spread relative to other pairs and selling XRP into that channel. 4. Considering that in the context of stablecoins, you're essentially saying "we know XRP is at least -this- liquid according to the other pairings we have data on, so we can safely increase liquidity here where it's low for some reason. We aren't going to create a failed stablecoin because we have compelling reason to believe the market is more stable overall than we're demanding it be in this pairing." Am I on to something here? I plan to go parse out the language with diagrams when I have time
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