6. Meanwhile, Larsen—Ripple’s initial chief executive officer (“CEO”) and current chairman of the Board—and Garlinghouse—Ripple’s current CEO—orchestrated these unlawful sales and personally profited by approximately $600 million from their unregistered sales of XRP.
7. Garlinghouse did so while repeatedly touting that he was “very long” XRP, meaning he held a significant position he expected to rise in value, without disclosing his sales of XRP
149. Ripple tried repeatedly and unsuccessfully to persuade that digital asset trading firm to “list XRP on [its] exchange” by offering to “cover implementation costs, paying rebates, [and] brokering intros to large XRP holders for custody.” Undaunted by these initial failures, Ripple Agent-3 emailed the two owners of the firm directly in July 2017, copying Garlinghouse, and asked: “Does a $1M cash payment move the needle for a Q3 listing?”
338. Since its launch, ODL has gained very little traction, in part due to certain costs of using the platform. From October 2018 through July 26, 2020, only fifteen money transmitters (none of which are banks) signed on to potentially use ODL, and ODL transactions comprised no more than 1.6% of XRP’s trading volume during any one quarter (and often substantially less). 339. Much of the onboarding onto ODL was not organic or market-driven. Rather, it was subsidized by Ripple. Though Ripple touts ODL as a cheaper alternative to traditional payment rails, at least one money transmitter (the “Money Transmitter”) found it to be much more expensive and therefore not a product it wished to use without significant compensation from Ripple.
... and it just goes on and on... scan it yourself.